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than one statute, as in Thames, the second prosecution will be
allowed. But, if more than one statute is violated by the same
act or conduct, as in Bonfanti and Didier,the court will use the
same evidence test and the second prosecution will be barred.
Criminal conduct may often give rise to two or more possible
charges,4 but the constitutional and statutory rights of the defendant to protection against double jeopardy must be safeguarded. A crucial factor in insuring this protection is a workable standard for defining the same offense. The standard is
substantially clarified by the stress on both the same evidence
and same act or conduct in the instant cases.
Edward Sutherland

FoRUMv

SELECTION CLAUSES IN MARrrvME CONTRACTS

Respondent, an American corporation, contracted with petitioner, a German firm, for the towing of respondent's drilling
rig from Louisiana to the Adriatic. The contract contained provisions relieving petitioner from liability for damages suffered
by the tow,' and a clause stating: "Any dispute arising must
be treated before the London Court of Justice." While in tow
the rig was damaged, and respondent libelled petitioner in
personam and petitioner's tug Bremen in rem. Petitioner's motion to dismiss or stay the action pending adjudication in London, where the exculpatory provisions would be enforced, was
denied. 2 The Fifth Circuit affirmed on appeal,8 relying on an
earlier decision that jurisdictional clauses providing for an
exclusive forum were contrary to public policy and hence un43. See LA. R.S. 14:4 (1950) which reads in part: "Prosecution may pro-

ceed under either provision, in the discretion of the district attorney, whenever an offender's conduct is: (1) Criminal according to a general article of
this Code or Section of this Chapter of the Revised Statutes and also
according to a special article of this Code or Section of this Chapter of
the Revised Statutes; or (2) Criminal according to an article of the Code
or Section of this Chapter of the Revised Statutes and also according to
some other provision of the Revised Statutes, some special statute, or some
constitutional provision."
1. The contract contained the following provisions: "1. . . . Unterweser
and its masters and crews are not responsible for defaults and/or errors In
the navigation of the tow. 2. ... b) Damages suffered by the towed object
are in any case for the account of Its owners."
2. In re Unterweser Reederei, GMBH, 296 F. Supp. 733 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
3. In re Unterweser Reederel, GMBH, 428 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1970), aff'd
mem., 446 F.2d 907 (5th Cir. 1971).
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enforceable. 4 On certiorari the Supreme Court reversed,5 holding,
forum selection clauses are prima facie valid and are to be
enforced unless the resisting party can show that enforcement
would be unreasonable under the circumstances. MIS Bremen v.
Zapata Off-Shore Co., 92 S. Ct. 1907 (1972).
Traditionally, American courts have refused to enforce contractual stipulations designating an exclusive forum for litigation.0 While some early maritime cases contained language
indicating a contrary view,7 judicial disapproval was thought
4. Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958).
petition for cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
5. The Court remanded to the district court to determine whether enforcement would be "unreasonable," but with an admonition that "nothing
in the record presently before us would support a refusal to enforce the
forum clause." M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 92 S. Ct., 1907, 1916
(1972).
6. The most frequently cited early American case for this position is
Nute v. Hamilton Mut. Ins. Co., 72 Mass.(6 Gray) 174 (1856), which held such
clauses invalid as an attempt to affect "remedies," rather than a permissible
alteration of "rights." Often enforcement was refused on the same rationale
as that applied in early arbitration cases-such attempts to "oust the courts
of jurisdiction" were not to be sanctioned. See, e.g., Kuhnhold v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 251 F. 387 (S.D. N.Y. 1918), which cited arbitration
cases.
Clauses had been enforced where the cause of action had accrued;
Detwiler v. Lowden, 198 Minn. 185, 269 N.W. 367 (1935); Gitler v. Russian
Co., 124 App. Div. 273, 108 N.Y.S. 793 (1908). With a changing and more
favorable attitude toward arbitration clauses, some courts found that forum
clauses were arbitration clauses and enforced them. This argument was
successfully made in England in Law v. Garrett, 8 Ch. D. 26 (1878). In the
United States, it met with differing degrees of approval. Compare Kelvin
Eng'r Co. v. Blanco, 125 Misc. 728, 210 N.Y.S. 10 (1925), with In re HamburgAmerican Line, 135 Misc. 715 238 N.Y.S. 331 (1930).
Probably the first case to abandon such tenuous distinctions and hold
such clauses enforceable unless unreasonable was Mittenthal v. Mascagn,
183 Mass. 19, 66 N.E. 425 (1903). By the mid-twentieth century, the traditional hostility to enforceability had lessened. Compare Judge Learned
Hand's concurrence in Krenger v. Pennsylvania 1. Co., 174 F.2d 556, 561
(2d Cir. 1949) ("What remains of the doctrine is apparently no more than
a general hostility, which can be overcome, but which nevertheless does
persist."), with his earlier decision in Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie
Generale Transat1antique, 43 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1930), where he said it was
"well settled" that such a stipulation was unenforceable. Perhaps one
reason for the change in attitude was a realization that to enforce such
stipulations did not effectuate an "ouster of jurisdiction," but was discretionary with the court, and simply gave effect to the expectations of the parties.
See Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, O.A.S., 187 F.2d 990 (2d
Cir. 1951), where the court enforced a stipulation saying, "[i]t might be
said the court took jurisdiction and granted specific performance." See
Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 300 (1957), which collects cases involving both maritime
and non-maritime contracts. Citation to non-maritime cases occurs frequently in the reports and in this note.
7. Mason v. The Blaireau, 2 Cranch 240 (1804); The Jerusalem, 2 Gallis.
190 (1814); Thompson v. The Catharina, 1 Pet. Adm. 104 (1795). The fact
that these cases all involved the jurisdiction of United States admiralty
courts when all parties were foreigners probably indicates that the language
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to be the well-settled rule in admiralty until the middle of this
century. 8 Then, in 1955, the Second Circuit held such a clause
enforceable in Win. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line.9
In Muller, an ocean bill of lading covering a shipment from
Sweden to Philadelphia called for the exclusive jurisdiction of
Swedish courts; the court dismissed the libel, holding such
clauses to be enforceable unless "unreasonable in the setting of
the particular case."'1 Although Muller was later overruled by
the Second Circuit as being contrary to the Carriage of Goods
by Sea Act, 1 the court's reasoning concerning jurisdictional
clauses had gained general acceptance as a principle of contract
law,' 2 and many jurisdictions adopted this approach.'8 However,
courts in the Fifth Circuit, relying on the decision in Carbon
Black Export, Inc. v. The Monrosa,14 continued to hold forum
clauses unenforceable. 15
supporting dismissal if the parties had agreed upon another forum should
not be taken to mean that such a stipulation would be enforceable elsewhere; American courts of admiralty quite early developed a doctrine resembling forum non conveniens in cases involving foreigners. See generally

Bickel, The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal
Courts in Matters of Admiralty, 35 CORN.LL L.Q. 12 (1949).
8. See, e.g., Wood & Selick, Inc. v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
43 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1930); The Ciano, 58 F. Supp. 65 (E.D. Pa. 1944).
9. 224 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 903 (1955). This
decision had been foreshadowed in Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut
Knutsen, O.A.S., 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951), which also based its decision
upon the doctrine of forum non convenlens.
10. 224 F.2d at 808.
11. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-15 (1970) (hereinafter cited as "Cogsa'). In Indussa
Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967), the court held that enforcement of jurisdictional clauses in bills of lading covered by Cogsa would
lessen the liability of the carrier, which the act prohibits. To enforce the
clause would require a substantial additional expenditure to prosecute claims,
and foreign tribunals might not apply the act, or might apply it differently.
12. In Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, the court said that in Muller they
had "leaned too heavily on general principles of contract law," and not
enough on Cogsa. 377 F.2d at 202. See also Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koraton
Co., 326 F. Supp. 121 (N.D. Cal. 1971). This is also pointed out by the Supreme
Court in the instant case. 92 S. Ct. at 1913.
13. Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 367 F.2d 341 (3d Cir.
1966); Matthiessen v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1132 (D.
Minn. 1968); Geiger v. Keilani, 270 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Mich. 1967); Aetna
Ins. Co. v. The Satrustegui, 171 F. Supp. 33 (D. P.R. 1959); Calzavara v. Biehl
& Co., 181 So.2d 809 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1966). The Fifth Circuit also enforced
such a clause in Anastasiadis v. S.S. Little John, 346 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1965),
which can be distinguished from Carbon Black in that both parties were
foreigners. The court probably paid more attention to this fact than to
the stipulation.
14. 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958), petition for cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180
(1959).
15. Insurance Co. of N. America v. N.Y. Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 201
F. Supp. 76 (E.D. La. 1961).
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In the case under consideration, the Supreme Court placed
great emphasis on the fact that the contract had been negotiated
between two parties of equal bargaining power. 16 Even cases
holding forum clauses unenforceable had considered the comparative bargaining positions of the parties in determining the
validity of such provisions. Indussa Corp. v.S.S. Ranborg17 overruled Muller and held forum selection clauses unenforceable
insofar as they applied to Cogsa bills of lading. Although the
Indussa court explained the conflict in terms of a prohibited
"lessening [of] . . . liability"'

rather than looking to the adhe-

sive nature of a bill of lading, the principal purpose of Cogsa
(and its predecessor, the Harter Act)' 9 was to relieve American
cargo interests from having to submit to terms dictated by a
small number of British carriers.20 If the bill of lading was not
an adhesive contract, there would be no need to protect cargo
interests by legislation; the rules of the market place would
suffice. The question of equality of bargaining power was also
presented in cases which found forum clauses to conflict with
the Federal Employers' Liability Act 2' and its maritime counterpart, the Jones Act.22 While these decisions were based on the
presence of a statute prohibiting the employer from contracting
to avoid liability, some members of the judiciary would have
refused enforcement on the basis of the adhesive nature of
the contracts involved.'8
16. The Court in Bremen pointed out that petitioner's towage contracts
ordinarily call for German courts and German law; the stipulation of an
English forum was thought to be a concession to respondent. There had
also been other bidders for the contract. Chief Justice Burger's opinion
speaks of the contract as "freely negotiated," "made in an arms-length
negotiation." 92 S. Ct. at 1914.
17. 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967).
18. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(8) (1970).
19. 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-96 (1970).
20. A. KNAUTH, OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 120 (4th ed. 1953); A. YIANNOPOULOS, NELIGENCE CLAUSES IN OCEAN BILLS OF LADING 3-9 (1962).

21. 45 U.S.C. H§ 51-59 (1970). Forum clauses were held to conflict with
the act in Boyd v. Grand Trunk W.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263 (1949); and Krenger
v. Penn. R. Co., 174 F.2d 556 (2d Cir. 1949).
22. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970). A clause was held to violate the act in Voyiatzis v. National Shipping & Trading Corp., 199 F. Supp. 920 (S.D. N.Y.
1961).
23. In Boyd v. Grand Trunk W.R. Co., 338 U.S. 263, 266 (1949), Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson concurred in the result "upon the grounds stated
by Chief Judge Hand in Krenger v. Penn. R. Co." There, Judge Hand said:
"The Federal Employers' Liability Act bears evidence that in the eyes of
Congress employees do not bargain in all respects as equals with the roads.
... I would hold such contracts unenforceable unless the road shows that
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The Court also seemed to emphasize the international character of the agreement involved. This writer, however, does
not believe that the Court intended to limit its holding to affect
only contracts wherein American and foreign parties agree to
submit their disputes to a neutral forum. The prior jurisprudence, apparently well regarded by the Court,24 did not prohibit forum clauses in agreements between two American parties.
For example, the Court cited with approval Central Contracting
Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 25 in which the Third Circuit
enforced an agreement between Maryland and Pennsylvania corporations to litigate in New York City.26 Most admiralty cases
have involved parties of diverse nationalities, but rarely has a
neutral forum been stipulated in the contract.27 It is submitted
that the instant case should be viewed as approving rather than
limiting the jurisprudence which has developed since Muller.
Lower courts would therefore be unwarranted in failing to
enforce forum selection clauses merely because the parties are
American and the subject matter domestic, provided the contract
the employee was fully advised of their effect upon his rights." 174 F.2d at
561.
Judicial scrutiny of the parties' comparative bargaining power should
continue. This would call for enforcement of clauses contained in charter
parties, but uphold the decision in Indussa Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d
200 (2d Cir. 1967), which refused enforcement of a clause in a bill of lading.
For the proposition that inclusion of such a clause in a form contract renders it unenforceable, see Goff v. Aamco Automatic Trans. Inc., 313 F. Supp.
667 (D. Md. 1970).
24. "Although this traditional view apparently still has considerable
acceptance, other courts are tending to adopt a more hospitable attitude toward forum selection clauses. . . . We believe this is the correct doctrine
to be followed by federal district courts sitting in admirality." 92 S. Ct. at
1913.
25. 367 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1966).
26. For other cases holding such stipulations prima facie valid and
finding no requirement that the transaction be international in scope, see
Jack Winter, Inc. v. Koraton Co., 326 F. Supp. 121 (N.D. Cal. 1971); Matthiessen v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Minn. 1968);
National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Sanders, 271 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. N.Y. 1967).
Whether an agreement not to litigate in federal court, as opposed to state
court, would be enforceable is a matter beyond the scope of this note.
Home Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445 (1874), held such stipulations invalid,
and was commonly cited as authority for invalidating all forum selection
clauses. A recent case, however, Euzzino v. London & Edinburgh Ins. Co.,
228 F. Supp. 431 (N.D. Ill. 1964), held a forum clause could bar removal to
federal court.
27. For example, the Court cites with approval Cerro de Pasco Copper
Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, O.A.8., 187 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1951), where there was
a Norwegian respondent and a stipulation for Norwegian courts.
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was freely negotiated and enforcement would not be "unreasonable."2
The criteria set forth by the Court for the determination
of the "reasonableness" of enforcement include a requirement
that the non-contractual forum ascertain that no public policy
of that forum would be avoided by dismissal. To make such
a finding in the instant case, the Supreme Court had to confront an earlier line of cases holding that exculpatory clauses
in towing contracts were contrary to public policy and unenforceable, for to constrain respondent to litigation in England would result in enforcement of those clauses. In Bisso v.
Inland Waterways Corp.,29 the Supreme Court had said enforcement of such stipulations would encourage negligence and subject those in need of towing services to "overreaching" by
"others who have power to drive hard bargains." This reasoning has been severely criticized,8 ' and in recent years some
courts have allowed some circumvention of the policy set forth
in Bisso.32 Realizing the inherent weakness of the argument that

to enforce such clauses would encourage negligence, and having
found no "overreaching" in the instant case, the Court was
apparently willing to limit the Bisso policy to domestic waters"
and allow enforcement of the exculpatory provisions. This does
28. There is some question as to whether the decision can be taken as

authority in domestic non-admiralty cases. The federal diversity courts
which have dealt with the issue of whether state or federal law should
govern enforceability have managed to find the state law in

line with the

federal rule they wished to formulate, or found no state precedent at all.
Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 367 F.2d 341 (3d Cir. 1966);
Matthiessen v. National Trailer Convoy, Inc., 294 F. Supp. 1132 (D. Minn
1968); Geiger v. Keilani, 270 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. Mich. 1967).
29. 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
30. Id at 91.
31. Mr. Justic Frankfurter dissented along with Justices Reed and Burton, saying that there was no evidence in the record of "over-reaching,"
and that the decision would not discourage negligence "unless we are prepared also to forbid the tug to insure against such losses or liabilities."
Id. at 119. See also Covey, Validity of Contractual Clause Exculpating a
Party from Liability for His Own Negligence, 44 ILL. B.J. 229 (1955); Note,
69 HARv. L. Roy. 173 (1955); Note, 17 U. PITT. L. Rzv. 93 (1955); Note, 30 TUL.
L REV. 133 (1955); Note, 42 VA. L. Rav. 77 (1956).
32. In Flour W., Inc. v. G d H Offshore Towing Co., 447 F.2d 35 (5th
Cir. 1971); and Tenneco Oil Co. v. Tug Tony, 324 F. Supp. 834 (S.D. Tex.
1971), courts enforced clauses in towage contracts which required the tow
to pay for insurance and procure a waiver of subrogation against the tug.
This effectively released the tug from liability for its negligence. A similar
result was sanctioned in Slade, Inc. v. Samson Towing Co., 327 F. Supp. 555
(E.D. Tex. 1970). But see Crawford v. West Indian Carriers, Inc., 337 F.
Supp. 262 (S.D. Fla. 1971).
33. 92 S. Ct. at 1916.
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not mean parties will be allowed to contract for an exclusive
jurisdiction in matters where the non-contractual forum has an
interest of its own in adjudicating the dispute, but rather that
no such interest was found in this case.8 4 The mere fact that
the contractual forum will limit or deny the plaintiff's right
of recovery should not be a consideration, in light of that very
result occurring in the instant case.85
The Court also stated that enforcement would be unreasonable "if the chosen forum is seriously inconvenient for the
trial of the action."' The party bringing suit in the non-contractual forum would bear a heavy burden of proof, because the
parties in their negotiations must have anticipated some inconvenience. There should be few instances in which parties of
equal bargaining power dealing with a subject matter amenable
to foreign trial will be able to show the unanticipated inconvenience required for a retention of jurisdiction.8
Finally, the Court found the language in the contract broad
enough to provide for an exclusive forum for all actions, whether
in personam or in rem. The Supreme Court's dismissal of certiorari in Carbon Black had been premised upon the finding that
the stipulation there was not broad enough to exclude proceeding against the ship wherever it might be arrested;3 and
in subsequent lower court cases, the same argument was made,
sometimes successfully.8 9 Here, the language of the contract read
34. The Hague Conference on Private International Law would hold
clauses unenforceable in matters relating to the status of persons, successions, maintenance obligations, bankruptcy and analogous proceedings, in
matters of real rights affecting immovable property, and in the matter of
setting aside or modifying acts made in pursuance of public authority. The
Validity of Forum Selection Clauses: Proceedings of the 1964 Annual Meeting of the American Foreign Law Association, 13 AM. J. ComP. L. 157, 160
(1964).

35. Some earlier cases had held that this would render enforcement unreasonable. General Motors Overseas Operation v. S.S. Goettingen, 225 F.
Supp. 902 (S.D. N.Y. 1964); Chemical Carriers, Inc. v. L. Smit & Co.'s Internationale Sleepdienst, 154 F.

Supp. 886 (S.D. N.Y. 1957).

36. 92 S. Ct. at 1916.
37. Judge Wisdom suggested in his dissent in Bremen that jurisdiction

must be retained if the contractual forum would not entertain the suit.
428 F.2d at 906. Dismissal might be conditioned upon the foreign court's
taking jurisdiction and the waiver of such defenses as time limitations. See,
e.g., Pakhuismeesteren, S.A. v. S.S. Goettingen, 225 F. Supp. 888 (S.D. N.Y.

1963).
38. 359 U.S. 180 (1959).
39. Clauses were held to include the in rem action in Insurance Co. of
N. America v. N.V. Stoomvaart-Maatschappij, 201 F. Supp. 76 (E.D. La.

1961); and Nieto v.

S.S.

Tinnum, 170 F. Supp. 295 (S.D. N.Y. 1958). Jurisdic-
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"any dispute," and the Court had no trouble in finding this
included an action in rem. It is submitted that this distinction
was made in Carbon Black to avoid facing the issue of the
enforceability of forum selection clauses.40 In light of the approval given forum clauses in the instant case, courts should be
dissuaded from indulging in hypertechnical analysis of the
language used, and enforce the clause whether it reads "any
dispute" or merely "any action against the owner." The parties'
inclusion of such a clause should indicate an intention to provide an exclusive forum for settling their differences, and
admiralty courts have realized in other contexts that an action
against the ship is an action against the owner. 41
Harold Watson

THE DOMINANT MOTIVATION STANDARD FOR

BUSINESS BAD DEBT DEDUCTIONS

Taxpayer was president of a closely held construction corporation in which he owned 44% of the outstanding stock, representing an original investment of $33,900.1 He had signed an
indemnity agreement required by the bonding company which
furnished the necessary performance bonds for construction
contracts. After the corporation defaulted in its performance
of two contracts, taxpayer indemnified the bonding company to
the extent of more than $162,000 for which he was not reimbursed. Taxpayer claimed the indemnification loss as a business
bad debt and deducted it from ordinary income on his federal
tion was retained on the basis suggested above in cases involving a contractual limitation of actions. See Loomis v. S.S. Santa Rosa, 447 F.2d 105
(9th Cir. 1971); Silvestri v. Italia Societa Per Azioni Di Navigazione, 388
F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968). One district court even went so far as to say that
Carbon Black stood for the proposition that such a clause could not bar an
action in rem. Amicale Industries v. S.S. Rantum, 259 F. Supp. 534 (D. S.C.
1966). Peugeot v. S.S. Honestas, In Admiralty No. 8086 (E.D. Va., Nov. 10,
1959), also contains language which might support this proposition.
40. See the dissent of Justice Harlan in Carbon Black, 359 U.S. at 184.
41. See, e.g., Continental Grain Co. v. The FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19 (1960).
1. Taxpayer also held a full time position as president of a savings and
loan association from which he received a salary of $19,000. Taxpayer's services to the construction corporation, to which he devoted no more than six
to eight hours per week, included reviewing bids, making cost estimates,
obtaining performance bonds and bank financing. The son-in-law of the
taxpayer also owned 44% of the corporation's outstanding stock, while the
remaining 12% was owned by a son of the taxpayer and by another son-inlaw.

